10 LBs
A few of my own impressions of the Lakhdar Brahimi remarks, and the blog discussion generally:
1. I find myself in the unfamiliar and uncomfortable position of defending the UN when I note that Earl Warren's rhetorical question: "has the UN even influenced, let alone made, a major post-war decision?" is profoundly unfair. The UN is an organization composed of and directed by members. If a "major post-war decision" has not emerged from the UN (a claim I think could be contested but don't want to bother doing the research), that is really the fault of the membership, not the "UN" per se. Why has the UN been ineffectual in the past few years? Because of fractures in the membership (aggravated in part by the Bush administration). I don't really like the UN for a variety of reasons, and I agree that it hasn't had many high-profile successes in recent years (though the fairly successful elections in East Timor and Afghanistan are notable), but to criticize the UN administration for the failures of its membership strikes me as unfair.
2. That point aside, ad hominem attacks against my fellow co-bloggers such as this one are not appreciated.
3. I enjoyed Brahimi's remarks very much. I found him a candid, engaging and often funny speaker -- certainly more candid and engaging than your average still-serving diplomat.
4. That said, I didn't find that he made many "controversial" or non-obvious points, though others I have spoken to disagree with me. Looking at Brahimi's main points:
a) All political players -- even the unsavory -- should be incorporated into a post-conflict political process: That's certainly true, and few diplomats of Brahimi's stature would really contest that claim. Sure, many real human rights campaigners don't like that Dostum or Ismail Khan are involved in Afghan politics now, but I don't think most diplomats would quibble with their inclusion in the political process. Diplomats and governments are used to dealing with unsavory but powerful political actors. Rarely do governments refuse to deal with political leaders on human rights grounds (and often when they cite human rights, it's just a pretense masking other reasons -- See Castro, Fidel; Hussein, Saddam; Iran).
b) Elections are not a panacea and do not alone resolve underlying problems of post-conflict societies: this seems to me pretty accepted truth these days -- indeed, it is precisely why the US and others have spent so much money on security to help stabilize the new governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. That said, I think Brahimi made a very interesting and thoughtful point regarding the cost of elections, and the possibility of building off of models that are different than "western" models (i.e. India, Malaysia, etc.) that might be more cost-effective and culturally appropriate.
5. I suppose what was most unsatisfying about the talk was that beyond "Every situation is different and should be handled differently", Brahimi offered little prescriptive advice, let alone a blueprint, of how to best manage a post-conflict transition. He urged bringing all political players to the table. Fine. But we do that in Angola in 1992 and it blows up in our face; in Afghanistan in 2002 (minus the Taleban) and it seems to work fairly well. He cautioned that we must take a long-view of reconciliation and let local politics play out, with rather hands-off "advice" from outsiders such as himself. This is the same formula that the international community has used for over a decade, and it has a mixed record of successes and failures. I was hoping he would draw a few clearer lessons on what worked and what didn't from his career, rather than prescribe the same measures only done "better" or "more sensitively". Perhaps it is foolish to wish for more prescriptive advice, in light of the complexities of post-conflict situations, but I still do.
6. My friends who know Afghanistan better than I found Brahimi's staunch defense of Ismail Khan both surprising and satisfying. They share his enthusiasm for Khan as a "doer", and say that he (Khan) has been unfairly criticized by many foreign organizations in Afghanistan. Just interesting to note.
7. Brahimi's insistence on using "faction leaders" rather than "warlords" was an interesting semantic point. Brahimi justified this because of the "faction leaders" supposed political standing. I agree that "warlords" does not adequately capture all of the many hats Ismail Khan has worn or Ahmed Shah Massoud wore in his life. I prefer the term "field commander" over faction leader, because it recognizes that these men earned their reputations on battlefields, and the respect they still undeniably command among the populace is generally not out of superior conventional political skills or policies or platforms, but out of the militias they continue to control. Regardless of what we're calling them, I agree with Brahimi that these leaders need to be incorporated into the political process. Again, I don't think that is truly a controversial opinion, as that has indeed been what has happened in Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent, with the insurgency still ongoing, in Iraq).
8. I thought I'd get to 10, but it looks like I am struggling. I'm sure I've forgotten some things, and much of this may not make much sense, or may be seen as too nit-picky, or a misinterpretation of Brahimi's remarks. For any and all of those, I apologize.
9. On an only loosely related note, I thought it was interesting that Dean Edley showed up for this but not for Admit Day. Edley arrived at Boalt with something of a reputation for grandstanding. He is not doing a particularly good job of disproving that reputation. I am generally an Edley supporter, but as several classmates have commented over the past few days, the Dean's PR skills could use some improvement. I hope to continue this discussion in future posts.
10. It's Two for Tuesday at a bar near you! Why the heck are you still reading this long-a$$ed blog post?!
1. I find myself in the unfamiliar and uncomfortable position of defending the UN when I note that Earl Warren's rhetorical question: "has the UN even influenced, let alone made, a major post-war decision?" is profoundly unfair. The UN is an organization composed of and directed by members. If a "major post-war decision" has not emerged from the UN (a claim I think could be contested but don't want to bother doing the research), that is really the fault of the membership, not the "UN" per se. Why has the UN been ineffectual in the past few years? Because of fractures in the membership (aggravated in part by the Bush administration). I don't really like the UN for a variety of reasons, and I agree that it hasn't had many high-profile successes in recent years (though the fairly successful elections in East Timor and Afghanistan are notable), but to criticize the UN administration for the failures of its membership strikes me as unfair.
2. That point aside, ad hominem attacks against my fellow co-bloggers such as this one are not appreciated.
3. I enjoyed Brahimi's remarks very much. I found him a candid, engaging and often funny speaker -- certainly more candid and engaging than your average still-serving diplomat.
4. That said, I didn't find that he made many "controversial" or non-obvious points, though others I have spoken to disagree with me. Looking at Brahimi's main points:
a) All political players -- even the unsavory -- should be incorporated into a post-conflict political process: That's certainly true, and few diplomats of Brahimi's stature would really contest that claim. Sure, many real human rights campaigners don't like that Dostum or Ismail Khan are involved in Afghan politics now, but I don't think most diplomats would quibble with their inclusion in the political process. Diplomats and governments are used to dealing with unsavory but powerful political actors. Rarely do governments refuse to deal with political leaders on human rights grounds (and often when they cite human rights, it's just a pretense masking other reasons -- See Castro, Fidel; Hussein, Saddam; Iran).
b) Elections are not a panacea and do not alone resolve underlying problems of post-conflict societies: this seems to me pretty accepted truth these days -- indeed, it is precisely why the US and others have spent so much money on security to help stabilize the new governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. That said, I think Brahimi made a very interesting and thoughtful point regarding the cost of elections, and the possibility of building off of models that are different than "western" models (i.e. India, Malaysia, etc.) that might be more cost-effective and culturally appropriate.
5. I suppose what was most unsatisfying about the talk was that beyond "Every situation is different and should be handled differently", Brahimi offered little prescriptive advice, let alone a blueprint, of how to best manage a post-conflict transition. He urged bringing all political players to the table. Fine. But we do that in Angola in 1992 and it blows up in our face; in Afghanistan in 2002 (minus the Taleban) and it seems to work fairly well. He cautioned that we must take a long-view of reconciliation and let local politics play out, with rather hands-off "advice" from outsiders such as himself. This is the same formula that the international community has used for over a decade, and it has a mixed record of successes and failures. I was hoping he would draw a few clearer lessons on what worked and what didn't from his career, rather than prescribe the same measures only done "better" or "more sensitively". Perhaps it is foolish to wish for more prescriptive advice, in light of the complexities of post-conflict situations, but I still do.
6. My friends who know Afghanistan better than I found Brahimi's staunch defense of Ismail Khan both surprising and satisfying. They share his enthusiasm for Khan as a "doer", and say that he (Khan) has been unfairly criticized by many foreign organizations in Afghanistan. Just interesting to note.
7. Brahimi's insistence on using "faction leaders" rather than "warlords" was an interesting semantic point. Brahimi justified this because of the "faction leaders" supposed political standing. I agree that "warlords" does not adequately capture all of the many hats Ismail Khan has worn or Ahmed Shah Massoud wore in his life. I prefer the term "field commander" over faction leader, because it recognizes that these men earned their reputations on battlefields, and the respect they still undeniably command among the populace is generally not out of superior conventional political skills or policies or platforms, but out of the militias they continue to control. Regardless of what we're calling them, I agree with Brahimi that these leaders need to be incorporated into the political process. Again, I don't think that is truly a controversial opinion, as that has indeed been what has happened in Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent, with the insurgency still ongoing, in Iraq).
8. I thought I'd get to 10, but it looks like I am struggling. I'm sure I've forgotten some things, and much of this may not make much sense, or may be seen as too nit-picky, or a misinterpretation of Brahimi's remarks. For any and all of those, I apologize.
9. On an only loosely related note, I thought it was interesting that Dean Edley showed up for this but not for Admit Day. Edley arrived at Boalt with something of a reputation for grandstanding. He is not doing a particularly good job of disproving that reputation. I am generally an Edley supporter, but as several classmates have commented over the past few days, the Dean's PR skills could use some improvement. I hope to continue this discussion in future posts.
10. It's Two for Tuesday at a bar near you! Why the heck are you still reading this long-a$$ed blog post?!
posted by Anonymous at 4:05 PM
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