Cobra II: First Blood
I'm at a talk by Michael R. Gordon, co-author of Cobra II. It's put on by the Institute of Int'l Studies here in Berkeley. So, here's the liveblog. I will clean it up later.
-- By summer 2002 it was obvious to MRG that there would be a war with Iraq. But now embedding process was available to him. Embedded with land invasion planners, who dubbed the invasion plan Cobra II, after Gen. Patton's plan for breaking out of Normandy. Gained access to a classified doc that he uses in the book. The doc is about interrogation of Saddam and the info he held.
-- Sidenote: The guy on a wheelchair who points to stuff with a pointer on his head is right next to me. You may have seen him naked on the Berkeley public access channel. He reeks.
-- The two sides utterly misread the other sides political and military strategies. How did Saddam misread the US? Well he was mostly concerned with internal Iraqi threats. He had attempted to keep the Shi'ia down on several occasions. He had attempted to use chem weapons against them (not just the Kurds). He was also worried about a coup to the extent that the Republican Guard were not allowed inside the capital. One of the worst fears that Centcom had was turning Baghdad into a Stalingrad, but Saddam was more afraid of that scenario than the US. His strategy on wmd was to comply with the letter of the inspections, but on the other hand he didn't want the world to know that his cover was bare. He was concerned about the Iranians. Also he didn't think the US would launch a full on invasion. He didn't plan on the insurgency because he didn't think we'd get that far.
-- US miscalculations: There were Five.
1. When we were fighting the last war, the RG were the main enemy, so we felt obliged to defeat the RG around Baghdad, and then go to Baghdad and cut the head of the snake. But there were also paramilitary forces out there such as the Fedayin and now they are part of the insurgency.
2. Also Baghdad was not the center of gravity, maybe the Sunni Triangle or the Iraqi population were the center of gravity. So Sec of Def and Gen. Franks misread the enemy.
3. We did not adapt. There was ample evidence within a few weeks that the enemy we were fighting was not the same enemy we had planned. Commander of 5th Corps (Gen. Wallace?) predicted that we would be fighiting these guys after the fall of Baghdad. Washington ignored these recommendations thinking the Army was just reluctant to put the pedal to the metal. They did not plan on fighting a counter-insurgency and did not send in continued reinforcements. The Fedayin were not part of the script of the munchkins killing the Wicked Witch. There is an expression in the military, "the enemy has a vote." When they thought about the post-war Iraq, they wanted to transfer maximum responsibility to the Iraqis. They wanted to rely on the Iraqis to do the policing. We would govern through their ministries. These were the assumptions. In fact Sec. D gave a speech called "Beyond Nationbuilding" and advocated that we would not do Iraq like we did the Balkans, but instead we'd do it like Afghanistan. Then it became clear that we could not run it like Afghanistan, e.g. restoring services.
4. Dysfunctional Bureaucracy. Joint Chiefs, Sec. State, and others were cut off. Pres, VP, and Sec. D were the main planners.
5. Bremmer and Sec. D dissolved the Iraqi military.
-- So all of these combined along with our inability to meet the needs of the Iraqis, the aura of American invincibility vanished. Almost all US commanders in summer 03 believed there was an opportunity where if we had done the right, we would not have had this level of resistance.
-- Opens up for Questions
-- You told us what you know, now I want to know when you knew it. Did you know a few months into this what a disaster it was? If so on the basis of the factual stuff?
This took a long time to piece together, but quickly into the war MRG knew that the war was not heading in the right direction. E.g., on April 16, 2003, Gen. Franks flew to Baghdad and gave instructions about troops leaving Iraq. This was overly optimistic. Very early on it was evident that there is a mismatch between US admin planning and actual reality.
-- How much weight given to Powell given that he went through this once before?
There's a story about Powell sending Schwartskopff a division that was not requested. He told NS to use the force or if not send it back. He believes in not having any sort of a contest in a military match. He wants quick victory and an exit strategy. This even applied to Bosnia, where Powell was opposed to no fly zone. Sec. D wanted to reform the Powell doctrine and do something different. Gen. Franks got behind it. Powell had reservations about this. He expressed concerns about force levels, but as Sec. State he had no really say in this. Franks even mentions in his book that Powell called him and was a gentleman that Powell would raise the issue of troop levels with the Pres but he wanted to tell Franks first.
-- How did you get info declassified and how do you feel about Shock and Awe then and now.
I didn't get it declassified. I just published it. There are some things that he has exercised discretion. Shock and Awe really didn't work. Saddam knew what we were going to hit, and hung out with civilians. One of his palaces had no furnitures or art or housewares. And there were notes that said "Couch, room number 3 by the window." They never planned on torching their own oil fields. They were going to win. Same with this, they planned on moving back in after enduring the airstrikes. Best example is airstrikes before start of war where we tried to hit Saddam based on hot intel. Well we now know that he hadn't been there for years. There was not even a bunker at that location that we bombed. There was a moment after this when Saddam came on with thick glasses and we doubted that it was him. But it turns out he went to his Presidential Secretary's safehouse and wanted to give a speech to the nation. There was no teleprompter and no printer, so he wrote it out and read it with those glasses.
-- Bremmer says that there was no army to speak of.
He gives a partial self-serving account. It is true that the Iraqi army went AWOL. Well you can recall the Army. They were recalled in a sense. There was a decision made to pay them and they showed up to get their pay. The decision he made as the viceroy of Iraq was that he wanted to build Iraq in a way that was free from the taint of Saddam. But then Saddam didn't trust his own army so they couldn't all be Baathists. The argument he makes is the kind of Washington insiders make during spin control and not a genuine argument. Generals on the ground say it was a mistake to get rid of the Iraqi army.
-- Why was the intel on the resistance that would emerge so bad?
Well CIA was confident that the southern cities were ours. But precisely because the Shi'ia had risen up before and we didn't support them, the Shi'ia were weary. But the CIA in Afghanistan was pretty well wired in Afghanistan. They had a lot of old relationships there from the Soviet days and money can buy you a lot in Afghanistan. In Iraq we didn't have anything. We didn't have enough dots to connect them. On the analysts side, there were some people who emphasized sectarian strife.
-- Question inaudible
Abizaid wanted to put an Iraqi face to the whole thing. So he called Challabi's military attache, a US colonel attached to him, and 700 of Challabi's fighters were sent. The fighters did not contribute anything. Challabi gave a quick speech in Nasariya and that was it. The whole point is that we didn't succeed in putting an Iraqi face on this.
-- How do you feel about imbedding?
History of media within the military. Basically distrust of media since Vietnam. In this war there were all sorts reporters. The military's own history of the conflict uses a lot of the photos from imbedded reporters. In this war, a lot of the people who fought got the credit. In the first PG war, the Pentagon briefers got a lot of the credit. There are some questions about the media being coopted by the military, but overall it's a good thing. You are always dependent on your sources (e.g. white house beat), but a lot of the questions about the progress of the war have been raised by reporters on the ground.
-- Where do you think we are now? Is it a civil war? Where should we be going?
I don't have any special insight. Talking to his colleagues, it seems like Iraqis took a step back from the cliff following the Mosque bombing. This is not like Bosnia because the Iraqis have intermarried and they have coexisted. So now the Iraqi leadership is trying to avert a civil war, but Al Qaeda is trying to create the opposite because they feel this will create a situation that is completely ungovernable and force the US to leave. He hopes things work out because then the deaths would not be in vain. He has praise for Allil Zahad (? Or did he say Talabani? Unclear) whom Bremmer excluded from Baghdad.
-- Where'd Jay Garner go?
In Washington there was a sense that he and the retired generals he recruited were not in charge of the situation and they wanted a take-charge guy. As Bremmer became a force in his own right and made decisions on his own (though he reported to Rummie who was given charge of post-war Iraq by the President). Garner was not happy about how it all turned out. He was brought in under a different set of assumptions. We went from a guy who would do some refugee aid and set up a quick government to a guy who was a viceroy who rewrote the constitution. The Marines set up elections in Najaf for mayor, but then word came from Bremmer that the wrong guy was going to win so they had to cancel. The problem was that a hardline Shi'ia was going to win. Response to this is that well it's Najaf and that's like cancelling an eleciton in South Carolina because a conservative Republican is going to win. Marine Generals went on TV saying they are deferring the election and then went to argue with Bremmer. They blame this cancellation as the source of a lot of problems in the south because after this they saw us as occupiers.
-- By summer 2002 it was obvious to MRG that there would be a war with Iraq. But now embedding process was available to him. Embedded with land invasion planners, who dubbed the invasion plan Cobra II, after Gen. Patton's plan for breaking out of Normandy. Gained access to a classified doc that he uses in the book. The doc is about interrogation of Saddam and the info he held.
-- Sidenote: The guy on a wheelchair who points to stuff with a pointer on his head is right next to me. You may have seen him naked on the Berkeley public access channel. He reeks.
-- The two sides utterly misread the other sides political and military strategies. How did Saddam misread the US? Well he was mostly concerned with internal Iraqi threats. He had attempted to keep the Shi'ia down on several occasions. He had attempted to use chem weapons against them (not just the Kurds). He was also worried about a coup to the extent that the Republican Guard were not allowed inside the capital. One of the worst fears that Centcom had was turning Baghdad into a Stalingrad, but Saddam was more afraid of that scenario than the US. His strategy on wmd was to comply with the letter of the inspections, but on the other hand he didn't want the world to know that his cover was bare. He was concerned about the Iranians. Also he didn't think the US would launch a full on invasion. He didn't plan on the insurgency because he didn't think we'd get that far.
-- US miscalculations: There were Five.
1. When we were fighting the last war, the RG were the main enemy, so we felt obliged to defeat the RG around Baghdad, and then go to Baghdad and cut the head of the snake. But there were also paramilitary forces out there such as the Fedayin and now they are part of the insurgency.
2. Also Baghdad was not the center of gravity, maybe the Sunni Triangle or the Iraqi population were the center of gravity. So Sec of Def and Gen. Franks misread the enemy.
3. We did not adapt. There was ample evidence within a few weeks that the enemy we were fighting was not the same enemy we had planned. Commander of 5th Corps (Gen. Wallace?) predicted that we would be fighiting these guys after the fall of Baghdad. Washington ignored these recommendations thinking the Army was just reluctant to put the pedal to the metal. They did not plan on fighting a counter-insurgency and did not send in continued reinforcements. The Fedayin were not part of the script of the munchkins killing the Wicked Witch. There is an expression in the military, "the enemy has a vote." When they thought about the post-war Iraq, they wanted to transfer maximum responsibility to the Iraqis. They wanted to rely on the Iraqis to do the policing. We would govern through their ministries. These were the assumptions. In fact Sec. D gave a speech called "Beyond Nationbuilding" and advocated that we would not do Iraq like we did the Balkans, but instead we'd do it like Afghanistan. Then it became clear that we could not run it like Afghanistan, e.g. restoring services.
4. Dysfunctional Bureaucracy. Joint Chiefs, Sec. State, and others were cut off. Pres, VP, and Sec. D were the main planners.
5. Bremmer and Sec. D dissolved the Iraqi military.
-- So all of these combined along with our inability to meet the needs of the Iraqis, the aura of American invincibility vanished. Almost all US commanders in summer 03 believed there was an opportunity where if we had done the right, we would not have had this level of resistance.
-- Opens up for Questions
-- You told us what you know, now I want to know when you knew it. Did you know a few months into this what a disaster it was? If so on the basis of the factual stuff?
This took a long time to piece together, but quickly into the war MRG knew that the war was not heading in the right direction. E.g., on April 16, 2003, Gen. Franks flew to Baghdad and gave instructions about troops leaving Iraq. This was overly optimistic. Very early on it was evident that there is a mismatch between US admin planning and actual reality.
-- How much weight given to Powell given that he went through this once before?
There's a story about Powell sending Schwartskopff a division that was not requested. He told NS to use the force or if not send it back. He believes in not having any sort of a contest in a military match. He wants quick victory and an exit strategy. This even applied to Bosnia, where Powell was opposed to no fly zone. Sec. D wanted to reform the Powell doctrine and do something different. Gen. Franks got behind it. Powell had reservations about this. He expressed concerns about force levels, but as Sec. State he had no really say in this. Franks even mentions in his book that Powell called him and was a gentleman that Powell would raise the issue of troop levels with the Pres but he wanted to tell Franks first.
-- How did you get info declassified and how do you feel about Shock and Awe then and now.
I didn't get it declassified. I just published it. There are some things that he has exercised discretion. Shock and Awe really didn't work. Saddam knew what we were going to hit, and hung out with civilians. One of his palaces had no furnitures or art or housewares. And there were notes that said "Couch, room number 3 by the window." They never planned on torching their own oil fields. They were going to win. Same with this, they planned on moving back in after enduring the airstrikes. Best example is airstrikes before start of war where we tried to hit Saddam based on hot intel. Well we now know that he hadn't been there for years. There was not even a bunker at that location that we bombed. There was a moment after this when Saddam came on with thick glasses and we doubted that it was him. But it turns out he went to his Presidential Secretary's safehouse and wanted to give a speech to the nation. There was no teleprompter and no printer, so he wrote it out and read it with those glasses.
-- Bremmer says that there was no army to speak of.
He gives a partial self-serving account. It is true that the Iraqi army went AWOL. Well you can recall the Army. They were recalled in a sense. There was a decision made to pay them and they showed up to get their pay. The decision he made as the viceroy of Iraq was that he wanted to build Iraq in a way that was free from the taint of Saddam. But then Saddam didn't trust his own army so they couldn't all be Baathists. The argument he makes is the kind of Washington insiders make during spin control and not a genuine argument. Generals on the ground say it was a mistake to get rid of the Iraqi army.
-- Why was the intel on the resistance that would emerge so bad?
Well CIA was confident that the southern cities were ours. But precisely because the Shi'ia had risen up before and we didn't support them, the Shi'ia were weary. But the CIA in Afghanistan was pretty well wired in Afghanistan. They had a lot of old relationships there from the Soviet days and money can buy you a lot in Afghanistan. In Iraq we didn't have anything. We didn't have enough dots to connect them. On the analysts side, there were some people who emphasized sectarian strife.
-- Question inaudible
Abizaid wanted to put an Iraqi face to the whole thing. So he called Challabi's military attache, a US colonel attached to him, and 700 of Challabi's fighters were sent. The fighters did not contribute anything. Challabi gave a quick speech in Nasariya and that was it. The whole point is that we didn't succeed in putting an Iraqi face on this.
-- How do you feel about imbedding?
History of media within the military. Basically distrust of media since Vietnam. In this war there were all sorts reporters. The military's own history of the conflict uses a lot of the photos from imbedded reporters. In this war, a lot of the people who fought got the credit. In the first PG war, the Pentagon briefers got a lot of the credit. There are some questions about the media being coopted by the military, but overall it's a good thing. You are always dependent on your sources (e.g. white house beat), but a lot of the questions about the progress of the war have been raised by reporters on the ground.
-- Where do you think we are now? Is it a civil war? Where should we be going?
I don't have any special insight. Talking to his colleagues, it seems like Iraqis took a step back from the cliff following the Mosque bombing. This is not like Bosnia because the Iraqis have intermarried and they have coexisted. So now the Iraqi leadership is trying to avert a civil war, but Al Qaeda is trying to create the opposite because they feel this will create a situation that is completely ungovernable and force the US to leave. He hopes things work out because then the deaths would not be in vain. He has praise for Allil Zahad (? Or did he say Talabani? Unclear) whom Bremmer excluded from Baghdad.
-- Where'd Jay Garner go?
In Washington there was a sense that he and the retired generals he recruited were not in charge of the situation and they wanted a take-charge guy. As Bremmer became a force in his own right and made decisions on his own (though he reported to Rummie who was given charge of post-war Iraq by the President). Garner was not happy about how it all turned out. He was brought in under a different set of assumptions. We went from a guy who would do some refugee aid and set up a quick government to a guy who was a viceroy who rewrote the constitution. The Marines set up elections in Najaf for mayor, but then word came from Bremmer that the wrong guy was going to win so they had to cancel. The problem was that a hardline Shi'ia was going to win. Response to this is that well it's Najaf and that's like cancelling an eleciton in South Carolina because a conservative Republican is going to win. Marine Generals went on TV saying they are deferring the election and then went to argue with Bremmer. They blame this cancellation as the source of a lot of problems in the south because after this they saw us as occupiers.
posted by Armen Adzhemyan at 2:09 PM
6 Comments:
All military or geo-political defending of our actions in Iraq is based on our lack of comprehension of one glearing fact: what we did when we attacked the soverign country of Iraq, that did not attack us, or threaten us, or was a threat to us or any nation on the planet-was wrong.
Any solution that perpetuates, even a scintilla of doubt about our insane, illegal war, is also wrong.
No fancy technique of military strategy can change this situation.
So-called experts can write clever and catchy books until the cows come home-but we were still wrong.
The simple solution lies in these four phrases:
OWN UP to what you did to ruin Iraq and the region.
PAY UP for all the damages and emotional scars you created.
PACK UP and get the hell out.
and SHUT UP and stop forcing people and nations to do things the way we want them to.
########################
The plan I am sending you has been approved by many prominent thinkers and
activists in the field. Which includes: Benjamin Ferencz, Chief Prosecutor
at the Nuremburg Trials, Tom Hayden, Matthew Rothschild, Anthony Arnove, Danny Schecter,
Tony Benn- Former Member of the British parliament ,Reggie Rivers,
Robert Jenkins, Andrew Bard Schmookler and others.
I formulated this plan in September 2004, based on a comprehensive
study of the issues. For my plan to be successful it must be implemented
with all seven points beginning to happen within a very short period of
time.
I have run up against a wall of doubt about my plan due to it's
rational nature ,and due to it's adherence to placing the blame on the
invaders, and then trying to formulate a process of extrication which would
put all entities in this conflict face to face, to begin to finally solve
the dilemmas that exist.
If you read my plan you will see that it is guided by a reasonable
and practical compromise that could end this war and alleviate the
internecine civil violence that is confronting Iraq at this juncture in it's
history.
I am making a plea for my plan to be put into action on a wide-scale.
I need you to circulate it and use all the persuasion you have to bring it
to the attention of those in power.
Just reading my plan and sending off an e-mail to me that you received
it will not be enough.
This war must end-we who oppose it can do this by using my plan.
We must fight the power and end the killing.
If you would like to view some comments and criticism about my plan
I direct you to my blog: sevenpointman
Thank you my dear friend,
Howard Roberts
A Seven-point plan for an Exit Strategy in Iraq
1) A timetable for the complete withdrawal of American and British forces
must be announced.
I envision the following procedure, but suitable fine-tuning can be
applied by all the people involved.
A) A ceasefire should be offered by the Occupying side to
representatives of both the Sunni insurgency and the Shiite community. These
representatives would be guaranteed safe passage, to any meetings. The
individual insurgency groups would designate who would attend.
At this meeting a written document declaring a one-month ceasefire,
witnessed by a United Nations authority, will be fashioned and eventually
signed. This document will be released in full, to all Iraqi newspapers, the
foreign press, and the Internet.
B) US and British command will make public its withdrawal, within
sixth-months of 80 % of their troops.
C) Every month, a team of United Nations observers will verify the
effectiveness of the ceasefire.
All incidences on both sides will be reported.
D) Combined representative armed forces of both the Occupying
nations and the insurgency organizations that agreed to the cease fire will
protect the Iraqi people from actions by terrorist cells.
E) Combined representative armed forces from both the Occupying
nations and the insurgency organizations will begin creating a new military
and police force. Those who served, without extenuating circumstances, in
the previous Iraqi military or police, will be given the first option to
serve.
F) After the second month of the ceasefire, and thereafter, in
increments of 10-20% ,a total of 80% will be withdrawn, to enclaves in Qatar
and Bahrain. The governments of these countries will work out a temporary
land-lease housing arrangement for these troops. During the time the troops
will be in these countries they will not stand down, and can be re-activated
in the theater, if the chain of the command still in Iraq, the newly
formed Iraqi military, the leaders of the insurgency, and two international
ombudsman (one from the Arab League, one from the United Nations), as a
majority, deem it necessary.
G) One-half of those troops in enclaves will leave three-months after they
arrive, for the United States or other locations, not including Iraq.
H) The other half of the troops in enclaves will leave after
six-months.
I) The remaining 20 % of the Occupying troops will, during this six
month interval, be used as peace-keepers, and will work with all the
designated organizations, to aid in reconstruction and nation-building.
J) After four months they will be moved to enclaves in the above
mentioned countries.
They will remain, still active, for two month, until their return to
the States, Britain and the other involved nations.
2) At the beginning of this period the United States will file a letter with
the Secretary General of the Security Council of the United Nations, making
null and void all written and proscribed orders by the CPA, under R. Paul
Bremer. This will be announced and duly noted.
3) At the beginning of this period all contracts signed by foreign countries
will be considered in abeyance until a system of fair bidding, by both
Iraqi and foreign countries, will be implemented ,by an interim Productivity
and Investment Board, chosen from pertinent sectors of the Iraqi economy.
Local representatives of the 18 provinces of Iraq will put this board
together, in local elections.
4) At the beginning of this period, the United Nations will declare that
Iraq is a sovereign state again, and will be forming a Union of 18
autonomous regions. Each region will, with the help of international
experts, and local bureaucrats, do a census as a first step toward the
creation of a municipal government for all 18 provinces. After the census, a
voting roll will be completed. Any group that gets a list of 15% of the
names on this census will be able to nominate a slate of representatives.
When all the parties have chosen their slates, a period of one-month will be
allowed for campaigning.
Then in a popular election the group with the most votes will represent that
province.
When the voters choose a slate, they will also be asked to choose five
individual members of any of the slates.
The individuals who have the five highest vote counts will represent a
National government.
This whole process, in every province, will be watched by international
observers as well as the local bureaucrats.
During this process of local elections, a central governing board, made up
of United Nations, election governing experts, insurgency organizations, US
and British peacekeepers, and Arab league representatives, will assume the
temporary duties of administering Baghdad, and the central duties of
governing.
When the ninety representatives are elected they will assume the legislative
duties of Iraq for two years.
Within three months the parties that have at least 15% of the
representatives will nominate candidates for President and Prime Minister.
A national wide election for these offices will be held within three months
from their nomination.
The President and the Vice President and the Prime Minister will choose
their cabinet, after the election.
5) All debts accrued by Iraq will be rescheduled to begin payment, on the
principal after one year, and on the interest after two years. If Iraq is
able to handle another loan during this period she should be given a grace
period of two years, from the taking of the loan, to comply with any
structural adjustments.
6) The United States and the United Kingdom shall pay Iraq reparations for
its invasion in the total of 120 billion dollars over a period of twenty
years for damages to its infrastructure. This money can be defrayed as
investment, if the return does not exceed 6.5 %.
7) During the beginning period Saddam Hussein and any other prisoners who
are deemed by a Council of Iraqi Judges, elected by the National
representative body, as having committed crimes will be put up for trial.
The trial of Saddam Hussein will be before seven judges, chosen from this
Council of Judges.
One judge, one jury, again chosen by this Council, will try all other
prisoners.
All defendants will have the right to present any evidence they want, and to
choose freely their own lawyers.
Why were you allowed to post?
Did you take my umbrella last week?
Do us all a favor, take your meds!
I was going to post my manifesto as a comment, but somehow it doesn't seem like an original idea anymore. Armen: maybe a limit on post length is a good idea?
Look when I read the comment it reeked of copy/paste spam, but I'm letting it go precisely because it gives us a chance to knock on someone.
My own post length is a tad long, but I blame that squarely on the smelly wheelchair guy with the pointy thing on his head who's naked on the Berkeley public access channel at nights. To distract my attention from the rank, I just feverishly typed everything Michael R. Gordon said.
Hey, talking about rank (not the smelly wheelchair guy's rank stench -- I'm talking about the other kind), is there no more news and information about Boalt class rank? The "Show Us Your Cards" thread has been conveniently buried on the blog.
The rank thread was inspired by the OCIPin on Cristal thread. Armen said he structured it along those lines, but it didn't earn "sidebar" credentials (you'll note that Armen put a convenient link to the OCIP thread on the right hand sidebar at the top of the blog).
I suppose some would say it's too "un-Boalt" to sidebar the rank thread. Fine. But Armen brought up the subject of rank, albeit smelly wheelchair guy's rank smell in his last comment.
I don't think Ortiz gave smelly guy a class rank. He's probably not applying for a clerkship. Ortiz would probably have given him his rank if he told her he was applying for a clerkship, even if he isn't a Boalt student. Giving homeless people student status is probably a more Boalt-like thing to do than talk about rank. He also would have been offered a Boalt bathroom stall to live in so as to "clean himself up" for the clerkship interview process.
Seriously, naked wheelchair guy, what the fuck? Do you see him other places? Is that actually the strangest thing on television?
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