Breaking: Cal Supremes on Prop 8
The California Supreme Court has just issued its opinion on the recent certified question in Perry v. Brown, the Proposition 8 case. The short answer, so far as I can see, is that the case is headed back to the Ninth Circuit with only minimal guidance on the core inquiry: do the backer of Proposition 8 have standing to defend it?
Rather than read and contemplate the opinion, however, in true busy associate fashion I have given it a skim and will now fire off a few disorganized thoughts before turning the forum over to the comments where, no doubt, someone anonymous will do the hard work of saying something profound. Thanks for that in advance.
As you will recall, last year a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used the “certified question” procedure to send a portion of the case to the California Supreme Court. As Boaltie federal court nuts are no doubt aware, the procedure is designed to further our federal system of government by providing the federal courts with an avenue by which they may ask state courts to resolve “novel or complex questions of state law.” (This is also know as “judicial restraint” or “punting the question,” depending on the circles in which you run.)
In this case, the question certified was:
If you wonder why a federal court needs a state court’s help with this issue (i.e.., with whether a person has been injured in a way that is cognizable under Article III), you’re asking good questions. And, according to my very hasty read of the opinion, the California Supreme Court is on our wavelength. Rather than state “yes, these voters have been injured,” the Cal Supremes have avoided that question and asserted only that the backers of Proposition 8 have chosen a procedural path that is valid under California law. That’s a distinction with a substantial difference: instead of accepting the Ninth Circuit’s invitation to answer its own standing inquiry (which was a question of federal law anyway) the California Supreme Court appears to have addressed the relevant California law and left the rest of matters as they found them. Good for them.
The next step is a return to the Ninth Circuit where, hopefully, the panel will commence to answering its own threshold question: have the backers of Proposition 8 been (1) injured, in a way that is (2) fairly tracable to the defendant's wrongful conduct and that is (3) redressable by court order?
All of the above comes with the caveat that I have not read the entire opinion. I’ll get to it later today, I hope, but in the meantime discuss away.
Rather than read and contemplate the opinion, however, in true busy associate fashion I have given it a skim and will now fire off a few disorganized thoughts before turning the forum over to the comments where, no doubt, someone anonymous will do the hard work of saying something profound. Thanks for that in advance.
As you will recall, last year a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used the “certified question” procedure to send a portion of the case to the California Supreme Court. As Boaltie federal court nuts are no doubt aware, the procedure is designed to further our federal system of government by providing the federal courts with an avenue by which they may ask state courts to resolve “novel or complex questions of state law.” (This is also know as “judicial restraint” or “punting the question,” depending on the circles in which you run.)
In this case, the question certified was:
Whether under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or the authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so.In plain English, what the Ninth Circuit really wanted to know was whether the proponents of Proposition 8 had standing to defend it from a constitutional attach in federal court. Obviously (at least to those Boaltie federal courts nuts), Article III standing presents a rather common question of federal law, and not a “novel or complex question” of state law. But by disguising the inquiry in language like “particularized interest” (see the quotation above), the Ninth Circuit hoped to find a backdoor path to the issue -- that language is designed to tip off the Ninth Circuit as to whether voter-backers of Proposition 8 have an interest under California law that also is legally cognizable under Article III of the United States Constitution.
If you wonder why a federal court needs a state court’s help with this issue (i.e.., with whether a person has been injured in a way that is cognizable under Article III), you’re asking good questions. And, according to my very hasty read of the opinion, the California Supreme Court is on our wavelength. Rather than state “yes, these voters have been injured,” the Cal Supremes have avoided that question and asserted only that the backers of Proposition 8 have chosen a procedural path that is valid under California law. That’s a distinction with a substantial difference: instead of accepting the Ninth Circuit’s invitation to answer its own standing inquiry (which was a question of federal law anyway) the California Supreme Court appears to have addressed the relevant California law and left the rest of matters as they found them. Good for them.
The next step is a return to the Ninth Circuit where, hopefully, the panel will commence to answering its own threshold question: have the backers of Proposition 8 been (1) injured, in a way that is (2) fairly tracable to the defendant's wrongful conduct and that is (3) redressable by court order?
All of the above comes with the caveat that I have not read the entire opinion. I’ll get to it later today, I hope, but in the meantime discuss away.
Labels: Prop. 8
11 Comments:
>> have the backers of Proposition 8 been (1) injured, in a way that is (2) fairly tracable to the defendant's wrongful conduct and that is (3) redressable by court order?
The defendant is the state of California. Is the issue whether the backers of Prop 8 were injured by the state's refusal to appeal (and the remedy to force the AG to defend the statute)? Or is the issue whether the bakers of Prop 8 can substitute themselves in as defendant-intervenors?
The certified question asked both. Today's opinion really addresses only the second.
I'm sure that whatever the case is, the learned, unbiased judges of the Ninth Circuit will issue an opinion that is an objective, level-headed assessment of the Constitution without being unduly influenced by politics or partisanship.
Yup! Based on the Constitution and not the Bible.
Anyone know if you can check bar exam results on iPhone?
Thanks a lot, Patrick. I thought I understood the question asked ("Hey, California, who's your lawyer for propositions when the government executives punt?"), but now I'm confused.
The opponents are suing the state, right? The California Supreme Court just said the proponents can represent the state's interest. The state clearly has standing. And I didn't think there was any question about the plaintiffs having standing. Why would it matter anymore if the supporters were injured?
Beetle, I’m confused too.
After this decision, we now know that it is permissible under CA law for the supporters of a ballot initiative to represent the state’s interest in defending the law. What I don’t understand, though, is whether that piece of CA law creates an article III case or controversy between the prop 8 proponents and the prop 8 challengers? The jurisdictional requirements (and limitations) for a federal action are, or at least should be, separate questions who may sue whom under state law. If that's correct, then we still don't know whether the prop 8 supporters have standing. We know they have something akin to a cause of action, but that's different from standing.
Put it this way: imagine you are tortiously injured (say, by an Occupy protestor in Sproul Plaza) and imagine further that some provision of CA state law allows me to assert your tort rights in the event you don’t want to. Would that provision of law be enough to allow me to maintain a federal court action against the protestor? I think the answer is “no,” because I cannot demonstrate the requisite injury for article III standing. It is true that state law creates a procedural path to the courthouse, but I don’t really see how that procedural path adds up to the type of injury to me that would create federal jurisdiction.
So, too, with prop 8 supporters. We now know that it is permissible for them to stand in for the state, but that doesn’t necessarily mean all the article III requirements are satisfied.
Maybe I’m wrong, though.
I think we are all confused. The confusion stems from the fact that the Supreme Court has never clearly articulated the relationship between statutory standing and Article III standing.
The majority opinion in Lujan suggests that Congress may not simply "confer" standing to individuals: "the [lower] court held that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, selfcontained, noninstrumental "right" to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law. We reject this view." Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 at 573.
Lujan seems to suggest that the Court not Congress gets to decide what counts as an particularized injury. And it stands to reason that California can't confer standing if Congress can't.
Of course, other cases like FEC v. Akins suggest that Congress can create procedural rights in certain situations.
In my opinion, the question the Ninth Circuit is faced with is whether this case is more like Lujan or more like Akins. Is this a case where the state has created an abstract procedural right (Lujan) or does this procedural right protect a cognizable interest (Akins)?
Why do the defendants need standing?
I thought only the plaintiffs need standing to sue.
Defendants need standing to appeal.
From Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191 (I'll dispense with pin-cites hereafter; you can look it up), the Ninth Circuit's order certifying the question:
"States, however, 'ha[ve] the power to create new interests, the invasion of which may confer standing.' Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. 1697. 'In such a case, the requirements of Article III may be met.' Id."
A bit later in the order:
"If California does grant the official proponents of an initiative the authority to represent the State's interest in defending a voter-approved initiative when public officials have declined to do so or to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, then Proponents would also have standing to appeal on behalf of the State."
Followed immediately with:
"The parties agree that 'Proponents' standing'—and therefore our ability to decide this appeal—'"rises or falls" on whether California law' affords them the interest or authority described in the previous section. Proponents' Reply Br. at 8 (quoting Plaintiffs' Br. 30–31). It is not sufficiently clear to us, however, whether California law does so."
This differs from Lujan, insofar as it turns on California's having granted "official proponents of an initiative the authority to represent the state's interest..." The Court in Lujan was concerned with the sweeping conferral of a right on "all persons."
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